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Digital startups’ use of AI technologies has 
significantly increased in recent years, bringing to the 
fore specific barriers to deployment, use, and extraction 
of business value from AI. Utilizing a quantitative 
framework regarding the themes of startup growth and 
scaling, we examine the scaling behavior of AI, 
platform, and service startups. We find evidence of a 
sublinear scaling ratio of revenue to age-discounted 
employment count. The results suggest that revenue-
employee growth pattern of AI startups is close to that 
of service startups, and less so to that of platform 
startups. Furthermore, we find a superlinear growth 
pattern of acquired funding in relation to the 
employment size that is largest for AI startups, possibly 
suggesting hype tendencies around AI startups. We 
discuss implications in the light of new economies of 
scale and scope of AI startups related to decision-





Artificial Intelligence (AI) unicorns 1 , such as 
Google DeepMind, SenseTime, and UIPath have 
unlocked growth at an unprecedented pace. Networks 
and AI are reshaping the operational foundations of 
firms, enabling digital scale, scope, and learning, and 
simultaneously erasing deep-seated limits that have 
constrained firm growth and impact for hundreds of 
years [1].  AI startups seem to be able to extend the 
known types of scaling up, e.g., by being able to transfer 
potent machine learning models to other business use 
cases [2] or by providing new kinds of services that 
outperform humans in terms of perception and cognition 
[3].  We conceptualize growth as the process of 
changing in relevant measures of firm size and scaling 
as the relation of concepts to each other within the 
                                                 
1 Unicorn is a market term characterizing a newly founded firm that 
had rapidly grown to a private valuation of a billion or more US 
dollars [19] 
growth processes. Achieving substantial growth and the 
ability to scale accordingly is a crucial point for startups, 
especially in regards to obtaining funding, maintaining 
productivity and enriching the diffusion of new product 
and technological innovations [4]. 
Given their potential, it seems important to consider 
why AI startups do not always scale like traditional 
software and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) companies. 
Current Information Systems (IS) studies stress the 
potential barriers for creating value with AI 
technologies, such as unclear business cases for AI 
implementations, lack of leadership support and limited 
technological capabilities [5, 6]. They point to both the 
need for talent and access to data as well as the ability 
to capture value from AI applications. Indeed, recent 
industry reports point towards similar scaling problems 
stressing the expenses for cloud infrastructure usage and 
the problems of initial AI model setup that stem from 
data quality issues and unclear specifications [7]. 
Current observations paint the picture of AI startups as 
having to put a great deal of time into optimizing their 
AI models and collecting relevant data within the first 
two years [8] – effectively rendering their growth rate 
more similar to that of a traditional service company 
than to a platform or software company that can rely 
more on existing ready-to-use frameworks. For 
instance, many AI startups in the field of digital health 
focus on service business models before developing a 
more scalable approach [9]. 
At the core of these considerations is the question of 
whether there exist substantial differences between the 
“AI” and more classical digital startups and if so, how 
they can also be measured empirically. Hence the 
research question of this paper is: How do AI startups 
scale compared to non-AI startups? This is important 
for both management and investors since the current 
hype around AI falls short in describing the growth 
process of AI startups; yet and moreover, risks with 
regards to the initial phase of an AI startup tend to be 
 







more concealed. Those AI startups are contrasted with, 
succinctly put, non-AI startups, especially those with a 
platform or service model, which does not indicate 
involvement of AI as a core of their business model. 
Drawing on a rich body of literature regarding platform 
and service startups, we theorize on how the mentioned 
types of startups should be able to scale compared to AI 
startups. Current reports provide indications that AI 
startups may scale more like traditional service 
companies tend to despite the big scaling potential of AI 
startups due to data network effects [8]. 
Our study uses data sets collected from the large-
scale content aggregator Crunchbase 2 . Employing a 
quantitative predictive framework for growth and 
scaling, we analyze how size measures scale in relation 
to selected business measures, i.e. revenues and 
acquired funds, using OLS regression on a dataset of 
12,373 AI startups, 11,839 platform startups and 24,401 
professional service startups to examine group 
differences. We find that all types of startups show 
sublinear growth in terms of size and revenue and 
superlinear growth in terms of size and acquired 
funding. Additionally, taking into account the startups’ 
age, we find that higher revenue is about as closely 
connected with more employees for AI startups as it is 
for service startups. 
Our methodology allows for the quantification of 
scaling characteristics for different startup ventures. The 
empirical results provide critical arguments over 
phenomena of new economies of scale and scope of AI 
startups. First, we provide quantifiable differences 
between AI and non-AI startups. We then link the 
specific need for use of human resources in the process 
of scaling up among the different startup types. On 
average, AI startups seem to need more human 
resources in order to scale than platform startups and 
about as many as service startups do. 
 
2. Growth and Scaling Characteristics of 
AI Startups 
 
Growth of startups has been conceptualized in prior 
research, and we will briefly examine key findings 
relevant for AI scaling. We describe both growth and 
scaling while focusing on the growth characteristics of 
AI-based startups in comparison to two other startup 
types, i.e. platform and service. Our aim is to present a 
quantitative framework that allows for measuring 
growth and scaling differences between the three 
aforementioned startup types. 
  
                                                 
2 https://www.crunchbase.com/ 
2.1 Digital Startups and Growth 
 
We conceptualize growth as the process of changing 
in relevant measures of size, this includes: sales 
revenue, employees, and operating profits. Growth is 
deeply embedded in the scientific interests of 
entrepreneurship, so much so that it is sometimes 
included in the distinction between startups and small 
enterprises [10]. As a result, startups have been 
conceptualized as young, growth-oriented firms that 
engage in innovative behavior [11]. 
From this vantage point, digital startups can be 
further described as firms that market, deliver, and 
support a digital product or service online [12]. Digital 
startups rely on aspects of digital media and IT to pursue 
market opportunities [13]. They often do this by using 
emerging digital technologies such as AI, machine 
learning, deep learning, natural language processing, big 
data analytics, virtual reality, IoT platforms, 3D 
printing, or cloud computing [14, 15]. The important 
function of digital technology for startups lies in at least 
three different roles [16]: Digital startups may use 
digital technologies as a context, an enabler, or an 
outcome of their business. As a context, digital 
technologies help a startup coordinate, communicate, 
lead, organize, plan, and control. As an enabler, they 
facilitate better tangible and intangible methods of 
decision-making. As an outcome, digital technologies 
are the product or service the company produces, such 
as in delivering software to customers or producing 
hardware. Overall, digital startups make situated use of 
these three possible roles for IT to scale their venture. 
Regarding such digital technologies, it is still widely 
discussed which occasions create the affordances for 
faster growth [17].  Fast growing digital startups often 
show significant traction enrolling customers, a 
validated business model and higher total funding than 
slower growing startups [18]. However, what makes 
digital business models easier to scale is that the 
marginal cost of serving an additional user on many 
digital networks is, for all purposes, zero, apart from the 
small incremental cost of (cloud) computing capacity 
[1]. At the same time, where low entry costs and 
plentiful capital is often available to digital startups, the 
entry barriers are thus quite low, resulting in an very 
large number of entrants into this specific market of 
startups [19]. Thus, Kenney and Zysman [19] argue that 
the competition ignites an equity-consuming race to 
build a market. 
An important aspect of these growth processes is that 
different business sectors show different setup times, 




There has already been some research on growth 
mechanisms of specific types of non-AI digital startups, 
such as platform startups (e.g., [20–23]) and 
professional service startups (e.g, [24–26]). Huang et al. 
[20] summed up the mechanisms of rapid growth of an 
innovative platform startup as (i) being data-driven, (ii) 
being able to release and launch modifications instantly 
and (iii) being able to swiftly transform novel value-in-
use—and therefore able to reduce marginal costs for 
every new customer to close to zero. 
In contrast, professional service startups are 
characterized by high knowledge intensity, low capital 
intensity, and professionalized workforces [27]. Such 
workforces, as well as the increasing capital intensity in 
the context of ongoing digitization, often still prevent 
them from rapid growth in the early years of their startup 
[26]. At the same time, the need for professional service 
providers is growing given an increasing knowledge 
demand in a technological society, putting ever more 
pressure on the need for an expertise in how to manage 
this knowledge [26]. 
 
2.2 Growth of AI Startups 
 
The focus of this paper is on AI startups. We define 
an AI startup as a digital startup having AI as a core 
component of its business model. This means that while 
we consider startups where AI is an enabler or outcome 
of the business model, we do not consider digital 
startups as AI startups where AI technology merely acts 
as the context to improve its work processes [16]. 
Examples of AI startups include companies in 
categories such as machine learning [28–30], intelligent 
systems [31–33], natural language processing [34–38], 
and predictive analytics [39–42]. 
When considering the growth of AI startups, prior 
literature has pointed out two vital aspects. First, AI has 
been characterized as the next general purpose 
technology to be attributed with the property of enabling 
significant complementary investments, which include 
business process redesign, co-invention of new business 
models, and human capital [3]. To be even more 
specific, potent AI models allow for a high prediction 
quality and can therefore consistently identify and meet 
customer requirements [43]. In addition, it has been 
pointed out that once a mature AI model is set up, it has 
the potential for being transferred to other business use 
cases within the enterprise [1]. Second, Gregory et al. 
[8] stress the importance of data network effects for 
creating user value. This is a pertinent value to 
complement those well-documented direct and indirect 
network effects. Data network effects occur when the 
more that the AI platform learns from the data it collects 
on users, the more valuable the AI platform becomes to 
each user.  In turn, just as Andrew Ng [44] observed, 
talent and data seem to be the most scarce, yet crucial 
resources for a flourishing AI startup. 
Both IS literature and industry reports indicate 
common issues for AI startups: As Berente et al. pointed 
out, there is significant uncertainty for businesses 
regarding how to manage AI [6]. It adds a level of 
complexity that surpasses traditional, less data-intense 
IT applications [45]. Alsheibani, Cheung, and Messom 
[5] highlight barriers for creating and capturing value 
using AI technologies, such as unclear business cases 
for AI implementations, lack of leadership support, and 
limited technological capabilities. These aspects not 
only point to the need for a solid backbone of skillful 
developers, an adequate toolset and a model that is 
trained on unique data but also to the fact that there 
seems to be a lack of clarity about how to extract 
business value from the use of unfolding AI 
technologies. Furthermore, current industry reports 
underline practical problems stemming from the 
mentioned issues [7]: First, expensive cloud 
infrastructure usage that requires ongoing human 
support is often required. Second, a great number of 
edge cases pose a problem for the initial model setup—
it has been surmised that AI lives in the long tail [46]. 
Lastly, defensive moats are weaker due to the 
commoditization of AI models and algorithms. 
Considering these uncertainties, we present in the 
following subsection a way to quantitatively measure 
and predict the properties of the scaling behavior of AI 
startups. 
 
2.3 Quantifying the Scaling Characteristics of 
AI Startups 
 
In this subsection, we aim to unearth certain 
universal principles regarding growth and scaling of 
startups that could, in turn, provide a basis for a 
quantitative predictive framework. For starters, we 
define scaling as how size-related concepts relate to 
each other during the growth process, such as the 
relation of the number of employees and the operating 
profits of startups. Scaling, therefore, refers to how the 
individual components of a system respond when its 
size changes [47].  Scaling arguments can lead to a deep 
understanding of the dynamics of the system of our 
interest, especially if it is a continuously evolving 
complex adaptive system, such as the organizational 
structure of a startup. 
According to Bettencourt et al. [48], there are three 
types of scaling dynamics. Sublinear scaling 
characterizes sigmoidal growth that eventually 
converges to the carrying capacity N. The driving forces 
put in more economic terms are efficiency, savings in 




corresponding log-transformed regression line 
describing the relationship of the scaling variables is 
smaller than one. Linear scaling characterizes growth 
that is exponential since the relative or percentage 
growth rate is constant. The slope of the corresponding 
log-transformed regression line equals one. Superlinear 
scaling characterizes growth that diverges within a finite 
time t. In economic discourse, superlinear growth often 
describes increasing returns to scale, as well as self-
reinforcing growth mechanisms that lead to unbounded 
growth—or a boom. Of course, if resources get sparse, 
superlinear dynamics are necessarily followed by a 
collapse. The slope of the corresponding log-
transformed regression is greater than one. 
The scaling perspective has been put to use in the 
field of biology in order to characterize the growth 
properties of human and animal ecosystems [49–51] and 
in the field of urban growth [48, 52]. While scaling 
theory has not been widely used in the management and 
IS literature, there are a few notable works. Axtell [53] 
deployed an agent-based model in which the theory 
serves as an input for assumption formation. The 
simulation model analyzes endogenous firm dynamics 
and labor flows via heterogeneous agents. Another 
study that deployed a scaling perspective to analyze the 
dependence of growth on company size, and derived 
from all US traded manufacturing companies from 1975 
to 1991 a model wherein the probability of a company's 
growth depends on its past and present sales accounts 
[54]. 
Furthermore, the scaling theory has been used by 
West [47] to measure the scaling behavior of publicly 
traded companies using the Compustat dataset. West 
discovered sublinear scaling of employees and net 
income. This sublinear scaling mechanism hints at a 
pattern of bureaucratic control, which is typically 
needed to administer the execution of the company's 
operational business model, within an ever growing 
organizational structure. When applying the scaling 
perspective to digital startups one is advised to bear in 
mind that entrepreneurial ecosystems are a much more 
turbulent and less predictable object of consideration 
than bigger companies [55]. Yet, losing some of its 
predictive quality, the theory can give insights into the 
different scaling behaviors of varying types of startups. 
When comparing the growth characteristics of AI 
startups with the two non-AI startups types (platform 
and service startups), we find an indication that AI 
startups might scale faster than service startups, as their 
marginal costs for more sales units is linked with 
employing more consultants3. However, in congruence, 
                                                 
3 Or as Anne Marie Neatham, COO of Ocado Technology put it: 
“Human beings can do everything that AI can do. They just can’t do 
it to scale.”, found in [1] 
AI startups may scale slower than platform startups as 
the marginal costs for one sales unit are close to zero for 
the latter. 
 
3. The Data 
 
We use Crunchbase database, which is an open-
source directory containing community-generated data 
on global technology startups and investors. We used 
the Crunchbase ‘business group’ categories to gather 
three classes of startups (AI, platform, and service 
startups). In addition, we would remove startups from 
one group if they also appeared in one of the other two 
groups in order to make the classes mutually exclusive. 
Together these comprised, respectively, 12,373, 11,839 
and 24,401 individual startups with a maximum age of 
10 years. 
We considered three variables as relevant for our 
scaling analysis: the number of employees, the 
estimated revenue range, and the total amount of 
funding. The table in Appendix 1 shows a summary of 
the descriptive statistics for those variables, as 
considered in our model for each of the examined 
startup types. The differences in the number of 
observations stem from missing values in the 
Crunchbase dataset regarding the three mentioned 
variables. 
The average number of employees is larger by a 
factor of roughly two for those service startups in 
comparison to AI and platform startups. Note that the 
startups of all three groups differ in their average age 
(4.2, 6.9, and 5.9 years for AI, platform, and service 
startups). We made use of an age-weight in an additional 
analysis, in order to consider this temporal dimension. 
Regarding the total amount of funding, the median 
seems to give a better picture in terms of not letting 
outliers distort the average amount: The median funding 
amount for AI startups is more than three times that of 
platform startups and 1⅔ times that of service startups. 
Regarding reliability of the Crunchbase dataset, we 
found that this platform tightly monitors their data. In 
particular, Crunchbase takes three means to ensure data 
curation [56]: First, the editors are part of the business 
to control for face value validity of the data. Second, 
Crunchbase uses machine-learning algorithms to 
compare data against publicly available information. 
Finally, data analysts recruited by Crunchbase take 
manual care of data validation. Being able to give basic 
trust to the data sources, we will subsequently present 





Table 1. Scaling exponents for business metrics vs. measurements of startup sizes 
Startup size X Business Metric Y Group β Adj-R² N 
Number of employees Estimated size of revenue 
AI 0.32 0.12 1,989 
Platform 0.20 0.05 5,047 
Service 0.43 0.23 7,016 
Age-discounted number 
of employees 
Estimated size of revenue 
AI 0.30 0.12 1,912 
Platform 0.24 0.07 3,838 
Service 0.31 0.13 5,115 
Number of employees Total sum of funding 
AI 1.30 0.36 3,081 
Platform 1.06 0.24 1,204 
Service 1.06 0.28 2,389 
Age-discounted number 
of employees 
Total sum of funding 
AI 1.31 0.35 2.942 
Platform 1.06 0.24 1,194 
Service 1.08 0.28 2,371 
In the following, we apply a scaling analysis as 
sketched in subsection 2.3. Note that we are treating 
ordinal data as continuous to perform a log-transformed 
regression analysis. The argument to do so is following 
the assumption that the numerical distance between each 
set of subsequent categories is close enough to each 
other in our analysis. Consequently, the results will be 




The scaling analysis in this section is comprised of 
two main steps: comparing the scaling behavior of (i) 
the number of employees vs. the estimated revenue, and 
(ii) comparing the number of employees vs. the total 
sum of funding. For both steps, we first consider the size 
in total and, second, we examine the age-discounted 
firm size. Summary results for selected exponents are 
presented in Table 1, and scaling relationships are 
visualized in Figure 2. 
The figures show the regression line and confidence 
margins for the log-transformed variables as well as the 
slope β of the log-transformed regression line. Using a 
measure N of startup size at time t, power law scaling 
takes the form Y(t) = Y0N(t) 
β. Y denotes a business 
metric, which is either the estimated size of revenue or 
total sum of funding; Y0 is a normalization constant. The 
exponent β reflects dynamic rules at play across the 
startups: It can be understood as an increase in the size 
N of the startup with a factor of one, which will lead to 
an average increase in the corresponding business 
metric by a factor of β. We will elaborate on the 
individual results in the following paragraphs. 
The first analysis compares the startup’s number of 
employees with its estimated revenue. We find sublinear 
scaling for all startup groups. The differences in the 
respective scaling exponents is still striking. We found 
the slope of our regression line for AI startups (0.31) to 
be higher by a factor of roughly 1.5 than that of platform 
startups (0.20). The slope of service startups in turn is 
higher by 0.12 than for AI startups. Taking into account 
the higher baseline value for AI startups with small team 
sizes (below 10), the result suggests that marginal 
revenue is more tightly coupled with an increase in the 
number of employees for service startups than for AI 
startups. 
We included the same analysis but with an age-
discounted employee count to account for the temporal 
aspect of the startups’ age. The age-discounted 
employee function f(x,y) ≜ 𝑥 ∗ e α*y with x being the 
number of employees, y being the startup age, and 
α being a weighting factor. The weighting factor α was 
set to 0.05 after testing the robustness of different 
models. The results show that among service startups, 
the slope drops noticeably to 0.31 while the slope of AI 
startups does not change nearly as much. This may 
suggest that age plays a more drastic role in increasing 
revenue for service startups than it would for AI 
startups. 
The next analysis depicts the scaling of the total 
amount of funding compared to the number of 
employees. The results show superlinear scaling 
dynamics for all three startup types. As expected, AI 
startups have the steepest increase of funding with 
employment growth (β = 1.30), followed by platform 
and service startups with an equal slope (β = 1.06). In 
addition, the median of the total funding for AI is about 
three times higher than for platform start-ups and about 
1.5 times higher than for service start-ups. The same 
analysis with an age-discounted employee count 
produces nearly the same results—this suggests the 
minor role of the temporal aspect concerning startup 
size in the scaling mechanism of the acquired funding. 
The results seem to stress the ability to acquire 
substantially higher funding for AI startups. 
It is striking that the explained variance for the 
funding is significantly higher than for revenue. This is 
reasonable since funding can be put to use immediately 
in order to gather more resources whereas revenue may 
be bound to certain commitments [19]. However, as the 





Figure 2. Scaling relationships for AI (red), platform (green), and service startups (blue): (a) the 
estimated amount of revenue vs. the number of employees, which scales sublinearly and (b) the 
total amount of funding vs. the number of employees, which scales superlinearly 
 
the overall variance and because the differences in the 
effect strengths are so vastly different for the startup 
groups, we believe it is an insightful variable in terms of 
group comparison. 
We included two further analyses by (i) splitting up 
the data geographically into Europe, Northern America 
and Asian-Pacific and (ii) examining different business 
categories of AI startups and included the results in 
Appendix 2. The regional analysis regarding revenue (i) 
reveals close to no differences for service startups but 
does demonstrate larger differences for platform and AI 
startups, namely: The beta coefficient is smallest for 
Northern America (AI: 0.23; platform: 0.18) and highest 
for Asian-Pacific (AI: 0.42; platform: 0.44) with Europe 
in between (AI: 0.29; platform: 0.25). Since the average 
value of the target variable is close to similar for the 
three categories, this may hint at a connection between 
employees and revenue that is much smaller in the US. 
In terms of funding, the regional differences are much 
smaller. The business category analysis for AI startups 
(ii) reveals that in the FinTech and the Health Care 
sector employees and revenue are connected most 
closely. Since these sectors are heavily regulated, 
market entry and data sharing prove to be especially 
difficult [9, 57]. Regarding funding amount, the more 
traditional sectors of Analytics and E-Commerce are 
less likely to gain more funding when having more 
employees. 
We ran several robustness checks to rule out other 
explanations. First, we cutoff revenue outliers at 
different top percentages to control for possible 
distortions by the most performant startups. With a 10% 
cutoff, the slope for every startup group dropped 
similarly by around 3% (AI startups) to 5% (service 
startups). Second, grouping the startups by age and 
running the same analyses shows that both the 
predictive quality and the slope β rise with a higher 
startup age, which is in line with the theory that bigger 
companies more consistently need more personnel in 




The previous section revealed sublinear scaling 
dynamics for the estimated sum of revenue in relation to 
the startup size for all three startup types. This result is 
in line with that of West’s [47] analysis regarding the 
scaling behavior of publicly traded companies we have 
referred to in subsection 2.3. Note that young startups 
will, of course, find it easier than larger companies to 
grow their revenues at higher percentage rates since it is 
the case that a small number is easier to double than a 
large one. 
Regarding the group comparison between AI 
startups with platform and service startups, we find that 
marginal increase of revenue is linked less closely to the 
number of employees for AI startups than for the service 
startups, but more closely linked than that found for the 
platform startups.   However, when incorporating the 
temporal aspect of a startup’s age, the effect size for 
service startups is reduced to roughly the same amount 
as that of AI startups, while the effect size of platform 
startups is considerably lower. This hints to the 
argument that the necessity for humans-in-the-loop is 
much less present for platform startups than for the other 
two startup types. In particular, AI startups seem to need 
nearly as much personnel to scale as service startups 
appear to.  
Furthermore, we find a superlinear growth pattern of 
acquired funding in relation to the startup size for all 
startups in our sample. The effect is biggest for the AI 




Figure 3. Increase of Crunchbase business 
categories from 2017 to 2019 for a sample of 
300 (a) AI startups and (b) service startups 
matched with the AI startups according to 
their company size and revenue 
an experience reflected in the number of investors in 
recent years [58]. 
Our findings pose interesting questions regarding 
new economies of scale and scope [1] in the growth 
process of AI startups. Scale effects occur when a firm’s 
operating model is designed to cope with greater 
volume, complexity, and number of customers [1]. 
Scope effects are defined by the range of activities 
provided by a firm as measured by the number of 
products or services provided. A firm’s operating model 
supports scope through having centralized functions or 
using advanced technologies [1]. IS literature has 
documented the important role of ‘scaling the user base’ 
for stimulating successful venture creation [20, 59], 
while being less concerned with scaling through other 
means such as data (see for exceptions [60, 61]). Thus, 
AI has been associated with new economies of scale [1, 
43], but beyond user scaling recent accounts have 
emphasized the role of data at scale [43, 62]. While it is 
not entirely clear whether the business value of large 
data has unlimited positive returns [43, 63], access to 
enough relevant data is unquestionably a bottleneck 
factor for many AI startups to scale. 
Some IS and innovation management accounts, 
which focus on platform firms have emphasized the role 
of scope effects in configuring diverse resources and 
knowledge into a coherent ecosystem [23, 64]. Certain 
researchers have argued that the increasing variety in 
different use cases makes AI (or specific forms, such as 
deep learning) a general purpose technology [65–67]. 
This means that AI is not limited to particular use cases 
or application domains, but transformative to many 
industries and domains [1]. This points to new scope 
effects where AI technologies remove bottlenecks, thus 
enabling startups to be less loyal to industry boundaries 
and transfer potent models to other sectors. 
We find evidence for this in the form of a massive 
increase in business categories of AI startups compared 
to service startups. Figure 3 provides an overview of the 
increase of business categories from 2017 to 2019 for a 
sample of 300 (a) AI startups and (b) service startups 
that were matched to them according to their size and 
revenue. An alternative explanation for this 
phenomenon could be the hype surrounding such AI 
technology [68], which has resulted in many startups 
deliberately choosing to integrate either AI technologies 
or, at minimum, the AI technology labels. 
Our results from the scaling analysis provide first 
empirical evidence that - on a large scale - the scaling 
behavior of AI startups does not differ substantially 
from service startups in terms of the need for human 
resources. Although both kinds of startups scale 
significantly differently than platform startups tend to, 
this is mainly due to having bigger teams not being as 
significantly connected with higher revenue. This points 
to AI startups having indeed a higher need for investing 
in human resource. The literature has consistently 
identified the two most common features of AI and 
digital platform startups regarding scaling dynamics: an 
operating model that allows for near to zero marginal 
costs for acquiring new customers [1, 69] and the much 
discussed network effects [8, 70]. Since there are 
measurable differences in the scaling behavior, an 
interesting research opportunity would be to further 





We aimed to better understand growth and scaling 
dynamics of AI startups. Using a large data set from 
Crunchbase, we analyzed the scaling behavior of AI 
startups and compared it to platform and professional 
service startups—making use of a quantitative, 
predictive framework. We found sublinear growth of 
revenue and superlinear growth of the total sum of 
funding both in a relation to the startup size as measured 
by the number of employees. Regarding the group 
comparison, we found that the marginal increase of 
revenue is as closely connected to employee count for 
AI startups as it is for service startups. Platform startups, 
on the other hand, seem to require less human resources 
for them to scale. Gregory et al [8] highlight the 




network effects. In extension, we show that limited data 
availability and efforts for configuring the AI model 
may cause AI startups to need more people in order to 
grow during their first years. For management and 
investors, it is important to understand that data and AI 
model setup are crucial considerations for the first years 
of oversight and that these points potentially limit 
growth posing a risk to survival. 
Our paper is not without limitations. First, the ‘label’ 
AI has been used to identify AI startups and to 
distinguish them from other types of startups. While 
data is well curated in Crunchbase further research 
should cross-validate whether the label and reality fit. 
Second, we focused on companies included in 
Crunchbase, which might have introduced a survival 
bias since being present in this data source may already 
be an indicator of a successful venture. Nevertheless, 
since our focus lies on digital entrepreneurs, we believe 
the large sample from Crunchbase can provide a 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Variable Type, Range and Distribution 
Variable Type and range Group Rank distribution 







represented by average: 
5:  (0,10] empl. 
25: (10, 50] empl. 
75: (50, 100] empl. 
175: (100, 250] empl. 
250: >250 empl. 
AI 5 (4,773); 25 (2,740); 75 (272); 175 
(175); 250 (51); N = 7,986 
Avg: 18.00; SD: 32.16; 
CI0.05: [18.30, 19.71] 
Q0.25: 5; Mdn: 5 
Q0.75: 25 
Platform 5 (5,873); 25 (2,327); 75 (320); 175 
(142); 250 (113); N = 8,775 
Avg: 18.76; SD: 36.55 
CI0.05: [18.00, 19.53] 
Q0.25: 5; Mdn: 5 
Q0.75: 25 
Service 5 (9,487); 25 (4,956); 75 (858); 175 
(1028); 250 (650); N = 16,979 
Avg: 34.05; SD: 59.74 
CI0.05: [33.15, 34.95] 






represented by group 
average  
$1M: 1 M$ (or less) 
$5M: (1,10] M$ 
$30M: (10,50] M$ 
$75M: (50,100] M$ 
$250M: (100,500] M$ 
AI $1M (931); $5M (1,138); $30M (52); 
$75M (6); N = 2,127 
Avg: 3,865,068.2; SD: 4,606,137 
CI0.05: [3,669,206; 4,060,929] 
Q0.25: 1M; Mdn: 5M 
Q0.75: 5M 
Platform $1M (2,409); $5M (2,776); $30M (180); 
$75M (26); $250M (17); 
N = 5,408 
Avg: 4,990,569.5; SD: 15,255,475 
CI0.05: [4,583,889; 5,397,249] 
Q0.25: 1M; Mdn: 5M 
Q0.75: 5M 
Service $1M (3,721); $5M (3,279); $30M (785); 
$75M (96); $250M (80); 
N = 7,961 
Avg: 8,408,617; SD: 26,413,412 
CI0.05: [7,828,314; 8,988,920] 





Continuous Values AI N = 3,549 Avg: 18,375,499; SD: 163,799,459 
CI0.05: [12,984,668; 23,766,330] 
Q0.25: 333,666; Mdn:1.6M 
Q0.75: 5.845.000 
Platform N = 1,387 Avg: 21,336,39; SD: 246,667,547 




Service N = 2,852 Avg: 33,505,429; SD: 416,917,899 

















Machine Learning 0.26 0.10 887 
Big Data 0.26 0.08 362 
Analytics 0.29 0.11 333 
SaaS 0.27 0.11 255 
FinTech 0.43 0.23 128 
Robotics 0.22 0.07 100 
E-Commerce 0.23 0.07 82 
Marketing 0.20 0.04 71 
Medical 0.34 0.16 48 





Machine Learning 1.23 0.37 1,506 
Big Data 1.27 0.40 451 
Analytics 1.09 0.34 413 
SaaS 1.13 0.38 417 
FinTech 1.28 0.44 211 
Robotics 1.31 0.44 152 
E-Commerce 1.09 0.23 136 
Marketing 1.19 0.44 89 
Medical 1.32 0.42 85 














North America 0.23 0.08 963 
Europe 0.29 0.12 467 
Asia-Pacific 0.42 0.29 200 
Platfor
m 
North America 0.18 0.03 1,911 
Europe 0.25 0.06 593 
Asia-Pacific 0.44 0.14 573 
Service 
North America 0.37 0.17 3,222 
Europe 0.38 0.20 808 
Asia-Pacific 0.37 0.16 728 
 Number of 
employees 
Total sum of 
funding 
AI 
North America 1.20 0.39 1,509 
Europe 1.15 0.36 852 
Asia-Pacific 1.34 0.39 350 
Platfor
m 
North America 1.03 0.26 632 
Europe 1.12 0.27 210 
Asia-Pacific 0.89 0.12 139 
Service 
North America 1.09 0.33 1,113 
Europe 0.98 0.25 458 
Asia-Pacific 0.88 0.16 349 
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